Supply-Chain Attacks Are Exploiting Our Assumptions
The article argues that modern software development relies on a set of implicit trust assumptions—about package origin, maintainer integrity, build provenance, and distribution chains—that attackers are increasingly undermining. It reviews recent attack vectors such as typosquatting, credential theft, build pipeline poisoning, and malicious maintainers gaining control. To counter these threats, defenders are developing tools and practices like typo-resistance checks (TypoGard/Typomania), static workflow analyzers (Zizmor), trusted publishing with attestations (e.g. in PyPI), Homebrew build provenance, and capability analysis (Go Capslock). The author calls on ecosystems and developers to shift from implicit trust to explicit, verifiable assurances across the software supply chain.
https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/09/24/supply-chain-attacks-are-exploiting-our-assumptions/
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